Komenda College of Education in the Central Region has received a generous donation of forty-one computers from Mr. Mohammed Baakoe in conjunction with his company, DRW. During the donation ceremony on Monday 1st July, 2024, the College’s Principal, Very Reverend Professor Kwesi Nkum Wilson, noted that Mr. Mohammed Baakoe, having recognized the significant role the College is playing in training teachers to boost education in Ghana, agreed to donate the serviced computers from DRW as part of its community investment initiatives.

The Principal explained that the donated computers would enhance the ICT Unit and support teaching and learning at the College, ensuring students graduate with better computer knowledge and skills. While presenting the computers, Mr. Baakoe mentioned his special connection to the College, as his father was once a tutor there.

Reverend Professor Kwesi Nkum Wilson expressed his gratitude to Mr. Baakoe, noting the substantial improvement in the number of computers since his appointment as Principal in 2019, increasing from about 10 to approximately 130. He assured Mr. Mohammed Baakoe that the College would take good care of the donated computers and urged the ICT students to maintain them properly.

Commissioning the computers, the Bishop of the Cape Coast Diocese of the Methodist Church and the Council Chair of the College, Right Reverend Richardson Aboagye Andam, thanked Mr. Baakoe and praised the Principal’s ongoing efforts to develop the College. He highlighted several achievements under the Principal’s administration, including procuring a Principal’s duty car, refurbishing the Home Economics block and ICT Lab, solving the issue of inadequate tables and chairs, and beginning the construction of staff bungalows set to be completed next year. He concluded with a blessing for the Principal and his management team.
The Principal also revealed that in 2021, Mr. Baakoe and DRW, where he serves as an IT Lead, had donated two servers currently used for the college’s Wi-Fi and networking activities.

Founded in 1992 DRW is a technology-driven, diversified trading firm that integrates risk management, research and technology in markets worldwide.

Introduction

West Africa has experienced an extensive range of security issues in recent years, from transnational crime and intercommunal conflicts to terrorism and insurgencies. Because of the interconnectedness of these problems, instability in one location can easily spread to nearby places, a process known as security contagion. It is vital to comprehend the intricacies of security contagion and ascertain crucial thresholds to proficiently tackle these obstacles.

While the analysis of security contagion through the lens of system theory has provided valuable insights into the interconnected nature of security challenges in West Africa, there remains a need to further explore the concept of critical thresholds. The system theory approach has elucidated how various factors interact to propagate insecurity across borders, but understanding the specific points at which these dynamics reach a tipping point is imperative for effective intervention. By focusing on the threshold concept, we seek to identify these critical junctures and examine how changes in the system can precipitate cascading effects of insecurity. Building upon the analysis conducted through the lens of system theory in part one, this article delves deeper into the intricacies of the security landscape of West Africa by employing the threshold concept. By examining how changes in the system result in tipping points of insecurity, we aim to unveil crucial insights into

Strategies for Mitigation: The Theoretical Framework

Threshold Concept from Process Geomorphology

Process geomorphology uses the term “threshold” to describe key locations in a geomorphic system where little perturbations can cause large, quick changes. These thresholds stand for the moments at which the system switches from one state to another, frequently resulting in major and occasionally permanent modifications to the environment. Take a river system, for instance. In typical circumstances, the river might gradually erode its banks and move silt. But the river might get close to a geomorphic threshold as silt accumulates. The river may abruptly alter its course and cause an avalanche when this threshold is crossed, possibly due to a minor increase in water flow after a very strong rainfall event. The river may carve a new course as a result of this sudden upheaval, drastically changing the surrounding area. As an example of the sensitivity of geomorphic systems to critical thresholds, the impact of exceeding this threshold is disproportionate to the initial alteration that triggered it (Schumm, 1979; Philps, 2006).

The threshold concept from process geomorphology refers to critical points in a system where small changes can lead to rapid and significant transformations. In physical landscapes, this might involve a river reaching a point where it suddenly changes course, leading to dramatic alterations in the landscape.

Analysis

Identifying Thresholds

Central to comprehending security contagion is the recognition of critical thresholds—points at which small changes trigger significant transformations in regional security dynamics. In the context of West Africa, these thresholds represent pivotal moments where the accumulation of stressors or triggers leads to abrupt shifts in the security landscape, often with far-reaching consequences. By identifying and understanding these critical junctures, policymakers can anticipate emerging security threats and implement proactive measures to prevent escalation.

Sensitivity to Perturbations

Sensitivity to perturbations is a feature that distinguishes the complex web of security dynamics in West Africa, where small changes or pressures can set off cascade effects that have far-reaching repercussions. This sensitivity highlights how vulnerable the area is to outside shocks, escalating pre-existing weaknesses and sparking security emergencies.

One significant area where sensitivity to perturbations is evident is in the economic sphere. West Africa’s economies are often fragile, reliant on sectors vulnerable to external shocks such as agriculture, extractive industries, and remittances. Economic downturns, fluctuations in global commodity prices, or disruptions in trade can have profound effects, exacerbating poverty, unemployment, and social unrest. For example, the Ebola outbreak in 2014 not only claimed thousands of lives but also severely impacted the region’s economies, disrupting trade, investment, and tourism and straining already fragile healthcare systems.

Moreover, political instability represents another source of perturbation with significant implications for security. West Africa has experienced a history of political turmoil, including coups, electoral violence and contested transitions of power. These disruptions undermine governance structures, erode public trust and create fertile ground for insecurity to flourish. For instance, the political crisis in Côte d’Ivoire following the disputed 2010 presidential elections led to widespread violence, displacement, and regional instability, highlighting the destabilizing effects of political perturbations.

Environmental degradation and climate change further exacerbate sensitivity to perturbations in West Africa. The region is prone to natural disasters such as droughts, floods, and desertification, which can devastate livelihoods, exacerbate food insecurity, and fuel resource-based conflicts. For example, the drying up of Lake Chad, a vital source of water and livelihoods for millions of people, has contributed to increased competition over scarce resources and heightened tensions between communities, exacerbating insecurity in the region.

Abrupt Changes in Behaviour

Within the context of security contagion in West Africa, abrupt changes in behaviour represent critical junctures where small perturbations or triggers result in disproportionate and often unpredictable responses within the security landscape. These sudden shifts can have profound implications, escalating localized conflicts into regional crises and exacerbating existing vulnerabilities.

One illustrative example of abrupt changes in behaviour is the escalation of intercommunal conflicts in the region. These conflicts, often rooted in competition over scarce resources such as land and water, can simmer for years before reaching a tipping point where minor incidents or perceived provocations trigger large-scale violence. An illustrative instance of abrupt changes in behaviour occurred in Nigeria’s Middle Belt region, where longstanding tensions between herders and farmers erupted into large-scale violence. The region, characterized by fertile land and a history of coexistence between nomadic herders and sedentary farmers, witnessed a dramatic escalation in intercommunal conflicts in recent years. A dispute over grazing rights, exacerbated by diminishing resources and demographic pressures, reached a tipping point when a minor altercation between a herder and a farmer sparked widespread violence.

In 2018, clashes between Fulani herders and Berom farmers in Plateau State escalated rapidly, resulting in retaliatory attacks, mass displacement, and widespread insecurity. What began as a localized dispute over grazing lands quickly spiralled into a cycle of violence, with reprisal attacks fuelling further bloodshed. Entire communities were displaced, livelihoods destroyed, and trust between ethnic groups shattered. The abrupt escalation of violence caught authorities off guard, highlighting the volatile nature of intercommunal tensions in the region.

Similarly, the collapse of fragile governance structures can precipitate abrupt changes in security behaviour, creating power vacuums that are quickly exploited by armed groups and criminal networks. For example, the ousting of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 resulted in the proliferation of arms and mercenaries across the Sahel region, fuelling instability and conflict in countries such as Mali and Niger. This sudden influx of weapons and fighters dramatically altered the security landscape, leading to a surge in violence and insecurity.

Moreover, military interventions aimed at combating extremist groups can inadvertently trigger abrupt changes in behaviour, exacerbating rather than mitigating security threats. Heavy-handed counterterrorism operations have resulted in civilian casualties, radicalizing populations and fuelling anti-government sentiment. These unintended consequences can further destabilize fragile states and exacerbate regional insecurity.

By understanding the dynamics of abrupt changes in behaviour, policymakers can develop more effective strategies for mitigating the risk of security contagion in West Africa. This entails not only addressing immediate triggers of conflict but also addressing underlying grievances, strengthening governance structures, and promoting inclusive development. Only through proactive and adaptive responses can the region hope to build resilience against the sudden shifts that characterize security contagion.

Process-Form Dynamics

In understanding security contagion within the context of West Africa, the concept of process-form dynamics emerges as a crucial analytical tool. Analogous to the principles of process geomorphology, process-form dynamics elucidates the intricate interplay between underlying processes and resultant forms within the security landscape of the region.

At its core, process-form dynamics highlights the dynamic nature of security phenomena, emphasizing the continuous interplay between driving forces and emergent outcomes. In West Africa, this manifests in the multifaceted interactions between various socioeconomic, political, and environmental factors that shape the region’s security dynamics. These factors act as stressors, exerting pressure on the existing security systems and pushing them beyond their resilience thresholds.

For example, the proliferation of armed groups in the Sahel region, such as Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), can be attributed to a complex interplay of socioeconomic marginalization, political instability, and porous borders. These underlying processes create fertile ground for the emergence and expansion of extremist ideologies, leading to the formation of new security threats.

Moreover, process-form dynamics underscores the nonlinear nature of security contagion, wherein small perturbations can trigger disproportionate and often unpredictable responses within the system. For instance, a localized dispute over land or resources between two communities can escalate rapidly, leading to widespread violence and displacement. These abrupt changes in behavior highlight the dynamic nature of security dynamics and the challenges inherent in predicting and managing security crises.

By adopting a process-form perspective, policymakers can gain a deeper understanding of the underlying processes driving security contagion in West Africa. This entails not only analyzing the immediate manifestations of insecurity but also identifying the root causes and underlying dynamics that fuel its proliferation. Through adaptive responses that address these processes, policymakers can work towards building more resilient and sustainable security systems that can withstand external pressures and mitigate the risk of contagion.

Synthesis

The synthesis of theoretical concepts and empirical examples underscores the interconnected nature of security dynamics in West Africa. The threshold concept provides a lens through which to analyze how changes in the system can precipitate cascading effects of insecurity, leading to regional crises. By identifying critical thresholds and understanding the underlying processes driving security contagion, policymakers can develop targeted interventions to prevent the escalation of violence and promote stability in the region. However, addressing security contagion requires a multifaceted approach that addresses root causes, strengthens governance structures, and promotes regional cooperation. Only through concerted efforts at the local, national, and regional levels can West African states hope to stem the tide of insecurity and promote peace and stability in the region.

4. Conclusion

In conclusion, the threshold concept offers a powerful framework for analyzing security contagion in West Africa and identifying critical points of intervention. By recognizing the sensitivity of regional security systems to perturbations and the potential for abrupt changes in behavior, policymakers can develop more effective strategies for addressing the complex array of security challenges facing the region. Moving forward, it is imperative to prioritize research and policy initiatives aimed at understanding and mitigating the drivers of insecurity in West Africa to foster lasting peace and prosperity.

On 28 May 1975, the Heads of State and Government of 15 West African countries established the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) when they signed the ECOWAS Treaty in Lagos, Nigeria. The Treaty of Lagos, as it came to be  known, was signed by the 15 Heads of State and Government of Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sénégal and Togo. The regional body was tasked to promote economic integration across the region. Cape Verde joined the union in 1977. The only Arabic-speaking Member, Mauritania, withdrew in December 2000. Mauritania signed a new associate membership agreement in August 2017. Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, three countries in the Sahel, also withdrew their membership in 2023 and formed a splinter group called the Alliance of Sahel States (AES/ASS), a mutual defence pact, on 16 September 2023. According to the ECOWAS website, the region spans an area of 5.2 million square kilometres.

Considered one of the pillars of the African Economic Community, ECOWAS was set up to foster the ideal of collective self-sufficiency for its member states. As a trading union, it is also meant to create a single, large trading bloc through economic cooperation. Integrated economic activities as envisaged in the area that has a combined GDP of $734.8 billion, revolve around but are not limited to industry, transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial issues, social as well as cultural matters. In 2007, the ECOWAS Secretariat was transformed into a Commission. The Commission, headed by the President, assisted by a Vice President, thirteen Commissioners and an Auditor-General of ECOWAS Institutions, comprises experienced bureaucrats who are providing the leadership in this new orientation.

ECOWAS says as part of this renewal process, it is implementing critical and strategic programmes that will deepen cohesion and progressively eliminate identified barriers to full integration. In this way, the estimated 300 million citizens of the community can ultimately take ownership of the realisation of the new vision of moving from an ECOWAS of States to an “ECOWAS of the People: Peace and Prosperity to All” by 2050.

Headquartered in Abuja, Nigeria, ECOWAS aims to promote cooperation and integration, leading to the establishment of an economic union in West Africa to raise the living standards of its peoples as well as maintain and enhance economic stability, foster relations among Member States and contribute to the progress and development of the African continent.

Among its objectives are the harmonisation and coordination of national policies and the promotion of integration programmes, projects and activities, particularly in food, agriculture and natural resources; industry, transport and communications; energy, trade, money and finance; taxation, economic reform policies, human resources, education, information, culture, science, technology, services, health, tourism and legal matters.

In addition, ECOWAS seeks to harmonise and coordinate policies for the protection of the environment, promote the establishment of joint production enterprises and establish a common market through the liberalisation of trade by the abolition, among member states, of customs duties levied on imports and exports, and the abolition of non-tariff barriers to establish a free-trade area at the community-level; adopt a common external tariff and a common trade policy vis-a-vis third countries, remove obstacles to the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital between member states and to right of residence and establishment.

The regional bloc has also outlined a comprehensive programme to establish an economic union through the adoption of common policies in the economic, financial, social and cultural sectors, and the creation of a monetary union for the sub-regional body. The programme will also promote joint ventures by private sector enterprises and other economic operators, through the adoption of a regional agreement on cross-border investments. It will further adopt measures for the integration of the private sectors, particularly the creation of an enabling environment to promote small and medium scale enterprises and establish an enabling legal environment.

In addition, it seeks to harmonise national investment codes that would lead to the adoption of a single community investment code, harmonise standards and measures and promote a balanced development of the region by paying attention to the special problems of each member State, particularly, those of landlocked and small island member States.

ECOWAS also encourages and strengthens relations as well as promotes the flow of information, particularly among rural populations, women and youth organisations and socio-professional organisations such as associations of the media, businessmen and women, workers, and trade unions.

The adoption of a community population policy that takes into account the need for a balance between demographic factors and socio-economic development is high up on the agenda of ECOWAS and so is the planned establishment of a fund for cooperation, compensation and development. ECOWAS also has authority to undertake any other activity that Member States may deem necessary for the attainment of community objectives.

The fundamental principles guiding ECOWAS are equality and inter-dependence of Member States; solidarity and collective self-reliance; inter-state cooperation, harmonisation of policies and integration of programmes; non-aggression between Member States and the maintenance of regional peace, stability and security through the promotion and strengthening of good neighbourliness. Other fundamental principles of ECOWAS include the peaceful settlement of disputes among Member States, as well as active cooperation between neighbouring countries and the promotion of a peaceful environment as a prerequisite for economic development.

ECOWAS also recognises, promotes and protects human and peoples’ rights, in line with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and cherishes accountability, economic and social justice as well as popular participation in development. The sub-regional body recognises and observes the rules and principles of the Community; as well as advocates the promotion and consolidation of a democratic system of governance in each Member State as envisaged by the Declaration of Political Principles adopted in Abuja on 6 July 1991. Lastly, ECOWAS stands for the equitable and just distribution of the costs and benefits of economic cooperation and integration.

ECOWAS envisages a borderless region where the population has access to its abundant resources and can exploit them through the creation of opportunities in a sustainable environment. As part of its broad vision, it foresees the creation of an integrated region where the population enjoys free movement across borders, access to efficient education and health systems, engages in economic and commercial activities and lives in dignity, in an environment of peace and security.

The Alliance of African States

On September 16, 2023, in Bamako, Mali, the governments of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger established a new regional alliance known as the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). The agreement, formalised by the Liptako-Gourma Charter, aims to create a collective defence and mutual assistance framework to better protect and serve their populations. Economically, they are aiming to adopt a new common currency, the Sahel, to replace the CFA franc. Colonel Assimi Goïta, leader of Mali’s transitional government, emphasised the importance of this alliance in addressing the common challenges faced by these nations. “The Liptako-Gourma Charter is designed to ensure our populations benefit from a robust structure of collective defence and mutual assistance,” he wrote, highlighting the urgency of regional cooperation.

The pursuit of such regional solidarity dates back to the immediate post-colonial era, when African nations sought to forge unity and cooperation. Between 1958 and 1963, Ghana and Guinea were part of the Union of African States, envisioned as the foundation for broader pan-African unity. Mali joined this union between 1961 and 1963, reflecting an early aspiration for collective strength and shared progress on the continent.

In recent years, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and other Sahel countries have grappled with the surge of radical Islamic forces, exacerbated by the destabilisation following NATO’s 2011 intervention in Libya. This instability has been a significant driver of the desire for closer regional cooperation.

The frustration with former colonial power France has been palpable across the region, leading to a series of coups: two in Burkina Faso, two in Mali, and one each in Guinea, Niger, and Gabon. This widespread discontent has sparked mass protests from Algeria to the Congo and most recently in Benin, demanding an end to French influence.

The anti-French sentiment has resulted in significant geopolitical shifts. French troops have been expelled from the Sahel, Mali has removed French as an official language and in Niger, French Ambassador Sylvain Itté found himself effectively detained. French President Emmanuel Macron described the ambassador’s situation as being held “hostage”, underscoring the deep resentment towards France’s actions and presence in the region.

The formation of the AES marks a significant step towards self-reliance and regional unity for Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. As these nations navigate the complex landscape of post-colonial legacies and contemporary security threats, their alliance represents a concerted effort to forge a future of mutual support and collective resilience.

Highlights of the Economies of Countries in the Alliance

Burkina Faso

According to the African Development Bank’s African Economic Outlook 2023, real GDP growth for Burkina Faso dropped to 3.2% in 2022 from 6.9% in 2021 because extractive activities fell by 13.6% in 2022 despite growing by 7.3% in 2021. The tumble was a result of the closure of several mines for security reasons. Other factors in the economic slowdown were socio-political instability, military coups, a deteriorating security environment and the effects of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The report said contributors to growth included agriculture (up by 10.3% in 2022 after declining by 12.3% in 2021) and the tertiary sector (up by 6.6% in 2022 compared with 13.5% in 2021). On the demand side, public investment fell. Inflation jumped to 14.4% in 2022 due to higher imports of food products and oil. Private sector funding in the banking sector rose to 16% in 2022. The budget deficit widened to 8.5% of GDP in 2022 from 6.3% in 2021 after public spending rose to 26.1% of GDP in 2022 from 25.6% in 2021 to address security and humanitarian challenges and provide oil subsidies. But tax revenue also increased to 16.3% of GDP in 2022 from 15.2% in 2021.

Public debt was an estimated 57.2% of GDP in 2022, up from 47.1% in 2021, suggesting moderate risk of over-indebtedness. The current account balance turned to a deficit of 5.2% of GDP following a surplus of 0.4% in 2021 due to higher costs for food and energy imports and a weak rise in exports. The security context and resulting humanitarian crisis have exacerbated poverty in rural areas (estimated at 51.1% in 2019) as well as unemployment (57% of the population aged 15 and older).

Outlook and Risks

The report noted that real GDP was projected to grow 3.7% in 2023 and 3.9% in 2024, less than the 6% average for 2017–19, due to socio-political instability and the deteriorating security environment. The restrictive monetary policy of the Central Bank of West African States and improved food availability are expected to reduce inflation to 6.1% in 2023 and 3.7% in 2024. The budget deficit is projected to fall to 6.1% of GDP in 2023 and 5.2% in 2024, despite increased needs to address security and humanitarian challenges, thanks to higher tax revenue. Public debt is projected to remain sustainable, rising to 62% of GDP in 2023 and 2024 due to an increase in treasury bonds issued to fill the budget deficit. The current account deficit is projected to narrow to 3.1% of GDP in 2023 and 2.9% in 2024. Possible headwinds include a delay in re-establishing constitutional order, pronounced deterioration in the security situation, inflationary pressures and lower prices for exported raw materials (gold and cotton).

Climate Change Issues and Policy Options

According to the Africa Economic Outlook (2023), Burkina Faso remains highly vulnerable to climate change and aims to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 29.4% by 2030. An estimated $636.9 million a year in climate finance is needed over 2021–30 for adaptation and mitigation, but only $284.5 million a year was mobilised over 2010–20, primarily from international partners. Both the private and banking sectors are involved in climate finance through the Intervention Fund for the Environment and through Coris Bank International (from the Green Climate Fund).

Yet, the private sector faces several obstacles, including low availability of resources dedicated to green investment, high cost of investment in climate change adaptation and lack of awareness of how to access climate funds. The country should thus adopt green financial instruments such as green bonds to mobilise additional resources, adopt tax incentives to encourage green investment and strengthen private capacity to design bankable ecological projects. The agricultural, forestry and pastoral sectors, which accounted for 22% of GDP in 2011–22) and the mining sector (10.7%) are key to creating wealth. These sectors employ nearly 80% of the labour force. If sustainably exploited, natural capital, estimated at $50.8 billion in 2018, could contribute to climate finance and green growth.

The Republic of Mali

The African Economic Outlook report said real GDP for Mali grew 3.7% in 2022, up from 3.1% in 2021, driven by the primary and secondary sectors, particularly cereal production (up 16.7%) and industrial gold production (up 4.4%), and higher consumption by households and government agencies. Inflation rose to 9.7% in 2022 from 3.9% in 2021, leading to three 25-basis point increases in key Central Bank of West African States rates. The budget deficit widened to 5.0% of GDP in 2022 from 4.9% in 2021. Of the 1,348.0 billion CFA francs ($2.3 billion) in funding need in 2022, 83.3% was covered through domestic financing, especially from the West African Economic and Monetary Union financial market (96.8% of domestic financing), where Mali’s Public Treasury raised only 71.9% of its resource objectives.

Public debt declined to 49.9% of GDP in 2022 from 52.0% in 2021, but the risk of over-indebtedness remains moderate. The current account deficit narrowed to 7.2% of GDP in 2022 from 7.7% in 2021, as exports rose more than imports (20% versus 10%). The banking system (comprising 14 banks and 3 bank-like financial institutions) recorded a marked improvement in portfolio quality, with a decrease in the nonperforming loan ratio to 4.2% in December 2022 from 4.7% in December 2021. Social conditions deteriorated in 2022, with the poverty rate rising to 45.4% from 44.6% in 2021, 1.3 million additional people in need of humanitarian aid, 20% of schools closed, and 2.5 million people lacking health coverage.

Outlook and Risks

Real GDP is projected to grow 5.1% in 2023 and 5.3% in 2024, driven by a recovery in cotton production, extractive activities (discovery of lithium), industrial gold production, the launching of new industries and the restructuring of struggling industries. Inflation is projected to moderate at 2.6% in 2023 and 2.4% in 2024 as a result of strong cereal production (expected to jump 7.7% in 2023 and 5.1% in 2024) coupled with the temporary suspension of grain exports. The budget deficit is projected to narrow to 4.8% of GDP in 2023 and 4.1% in 2024; thanks to the introduction of the Integrated Civil Service Management System.

Public debt is projected to rise to 53.4% of GDP in 2023 but will decline to 53.3% in 2024, with a crowding-out effect on credit to private companies from 2023 and domestic debt (27.6% of GDP) likely to exceed external debt (25.8%). The current account deficit is projected to narrow to 6.6% of GDP in 2023 (with the Export Development Strategy 2022–2025 set to raise exports by 25% by 2025) but widen to 6.8% in 2024. Possible headwinds include new sanctions by the Economic Community of West African States resulting from changes to the consensus timetable for elections, the lack of security, and the impact of climate change.

Climate Change and Policy Options

The cost of mitigation measures for 2020–30 is $3.0 billion and adaptation finance is estimated to be about $8 billion. To mobilise the needed resources, Mali will have to rely on a range of internal and external finance sources. The financing gap could be substantial, although the number of parties involved makes it difficult to estimate. The private sector has considerable potential, including the Private Sector Guarantee Fund. The government has designated the National Bank for Agricultural Development and the Development Bank of Mali to be accredited by the Green Climate Fund. A strategic plan has been developed to ensure that the private sector has an active role in climate finance. Private climate investment is being directed toward energy, waste management, forestry, and agriculture.

The private sector could profit from the country’s enormous potential, as Mali has some of the greatest solar power potential and the largest reserves of natural hydrogen in the world. The obstacles to private climate finance are the lack of information concerning opportunities, the lack of training in procedures for accessing climate finance, low participation in the development of climate change strategies and limited access to international finance.

Solutions to these challenges will require training in climate fund access processes, awareness-raising on the nature and impacts of climate change, the issuance of green bonds, providing access to clean development mechanisms, the sale of carbon credits, adopting ecological taxation and creating a private sector lending window for the Green Climate Fund.

Niger

Located in the heart of the Sahel, Niger has a poorly diversified economy and is dependent on agriculture for 40% of its GDP, according to the World Bank. The extreme poverty rate is expected to reach 52.0% in 2023 due to negative per capita growth and rising inflation, which, compared to 2022, will increase the extremely poor population by nearly 1.1 million bringing the total to 14.1 million people in 2023.

In 2023, UNOCHA reported that 4.3 million people or 17% of the population, required humanitarian assistance in Niger, compared to 3.7 million in 2022. By January 2024, according to UNHCR, Niger had hosted almost 690,000 refugees, asylum-seekers and internally displaced people (IDPs).  A majority of these refugees are hosted in Tillaberi, Tahoua, and Diffa regions.

Political Background

Mohamed Bazoum was elected president in the December 2020 and February 2021 elections. He was the first to democratically succeed his predecessor. But on July 26, 2023, members of his presidential guard dismissed him, justifying their decision by saying they wanted to avoid further economic and security problems.

Following this move, at an emergency summit held in Nigeria on July 30, 2023, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) strongly condemned the coup and imposed severe sanctions against the country. These included the closure of land and air borders with Niger, as well as financial sanctions such as the freezing of service transactions, including utilities, electricity and the freezing of Nigerien assets at the regional central bank (BCEAO). These sanctions had a profoundly negative impact on the population, notably by increasing the cost of living and causing a lack of electricity due to Nigeria stopping its electricity service to Niger. The sanctions were lifted by ECOWAS on February 24, 2024, following the announcement by Niger and other countries of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), including Burkina Faso and Mali, of their withdrawal from ECOWAS.

Economic Situation

Economic growth in 2023 is expected to be only 1.2% due to the combined effects of political, security and climate crises. ECOWAS trade sanctions and border closures have either reduced or delayed exports, including crude oil exports through the country’s recently completed and commissioned pipeline. Inadequate rainfall, crop pests, localised flooding, declining soil fertility and insecurity in some key production areas, have reduced agricultural production, despite a strong output from irrigated agriculture. The sanctions have also led to losses in the private sector, a liquidity crisis and a deterioration of portfolios in the banking sector.

After declining consecutively between January and July 2023, inflation has risen continuously since August 2023 due to low agricultural production and border closures. To counter inflation across WAEMU countries, the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) raised policy interest rates by a cumulative 150 basis points since mid-2022 to 3.5% for liquidity calls and 5.5% for the marginal lending facility. However, inflation in the region (3.7% in 2023) was still above the 3% target and foreign exchange reserves have been on a downward trend, estimated at 3.5 months of imports at end-2023, down from 4.3 months at end-2022.

The rise in food prices is expected to increase the poverty rate and has led to rising levels of food insecurity, with 2.3 million people estimated to be severely food insecure during November-December 2023, according to The Cadre Harmonisé analysis.

In response to the sanctions and the disruption in external financing, the authorities revised the 2023 budget by cutting capital expenditures. The budget deficit for 2023 is expected to be 3.9% of GDP and public debt is expected to reach 58.2% of GDP. The government has accumulated domestic arrears, as well as arrears with regional and international development institutions.

Outlook

With sanctions lifted at the end of February, growth is projected to rebound to 6.9% in 2024 under the following assumptions: (i) Niger – along with Burkina Faso and Mali – orderly exit ECOWAS in 2025 and remain part of WAEMU; (ii) large-scale oil production and exports is effective; (iii) international development financing resumes in H1-2024; (iv) agricultural campaign is not subject to climate shocks; and (v) there is no further deterioration of the security situation. However, GDP levels would be significantly lower in 2024 and 2025 compared to their pre-coup projected paths. Inflation is expected to moderate to 3.5% in 2024 following the lifting of the sanctions and moderating food prices following the resumption of large-scale imports.

The extremely high rate of poverty is projected to decrease by 2 percentage points to 50.0% by 2026 given solid growth in service and agriculture sectors and policies that use increased oil revenues for the population. However, due to demographic growth, the number of extremely poor would increase by 1.9 million people over the period 2023-2026.

Revenue in 2024, including grants, is projected to be around 11.0% of GDP, lower than projected in the approved budget, which would likely lead to capital expenditure rationing. With limited access to financing, the budget deficit is projected to be 2.6% of GDP, including an accumulation of domestic arrears.

The AfDB’s African Economic Outlook for 2023 saidNiger’sreal GDP growth rebounded to 7.2% in 2022, on strong performance across all sectors, particularly primary and tertiary services (which grew 7%), on the supply side and ongoing major infrastructure projects on the demand side. Inflation exceeded the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) target of 3%, fuelled by higher consumer food prices and the deteriorating international economic situation. The budget deficit widened to 6.6% of GDP in 2022 from 6.1% in 2021 due to public spending rising more than public revenue. Constraints on budgetary performance continue to be both structural (tax base, economic structure, economic and social needs, and the like) and cyclical (lower global price for uranium, closing of the border with Nigeria).

The budget deficit was financed primarily by external resources (budgetary support and projects), mainly in the form of grants. Public debt rose slightly to 51.2% of GDP in 2022 from 50.9% in 2021. Foreign loans accounted for 65% of public debt—below the WAEMU target—resulting in a moderate risk of external debt distress. The chronic current account deficit widened to 15.1% of GDP in 2022 from 13.9% in 2021, financed by concessional loans and foreign direct investment, which rose substantially between 2017 and 2020. The social situation remains precarious, with extreme poverty at 42% in 2021.

Outlook and risks

Real GDP is projected to grow 7.0% in 2023 and 11.8% in 2024, with all sectors growing at least 5%. Consumption and higher oil investment as well as exports enabled by the new pipeline are projected to boost GDP growth. Possible headwinds include a lack of security, climate change, a deteriorating international economic situation, and the like. Inflation will be contained below the WAEMU target of 3%.

Public finances are expected to consolidate, with a substantial increase in public revenue from oil production, and the quality of public spending is improving under the new public finance reform strategy. Public debt is projected to remain sustainable, with most external borrowing contracted on concessional terms. The current account and trade deficits are projected to narrow. Social conditions are also expected to improve, thanks to economic recovery and the resilience-building measures in the new Economic and Social Development Plan 2022–2026.

Climate Change Issues and Policy Options

Niger is highly exposed and vulnerable to the energy-related effects of climate change, as the country has substantial energy requirements for its economic and social development. The country’s objective is to fulfil its commitments under the Paris Agreement, particularly in terms of limiting the rise in temperature to less than 2°C or even 1.5°C by 2050. To meet this challenge and implement the revised Nationally Determined Contribution roadmap, Niger has developed a private-sector financing strategy.

The strategy sets out five areas for intervention: These include the mobilization and involvement of private industry and professional organisations in the adaptation, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of projects under the strategy.

A second intervention under the strategy is the updating of the overview of the market’s state of progress by identifying the sectors that are most promising and of the most interest to companies, compiling an inventory of companies in these sectors or with the potential to participate in them, and conducting a financing needs assessment. Other interventions will be the mobilization of financial resources from private funders as well as private stakeholders and corporations, and the implementation of an annual work plan and budget. The strategy will also include the promotion of climate technology innovation and capacity-building, training and technical support programmes for companies in the sector.

AES economic bloc

Collectively, the three AES countries, according to Ecofin Agency, will have a combined GDP of $62.3 billion. Burkina Faso, it noted, will lead the way, overtaking its neighbour Mali, according to the IMF. The agency indicates that Ouagadougou will nevertheless lag far behind the region’s leading economy, Côte d’Ivoire, which will post a GDP of $86.9 billion this year.

Ecofin pointed out that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecasts Burkina Faso to become the fourth-largest economy in the CFA franc zone in 2024, overtaking its neighbour Mali, which will now fall back to fifth place, despite an increase in its economy to $21.6 billion (from $20.6 billion).

According to the institution’s data, Burkina Faso’s economy, estimated at $20.3 billion (at current prices) in 2023, will reach $21.9 billion this year, ranking behind Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroon, and Senegal. Despite political changes impacting both Burkina Faso and Mali in recent years, particularly their withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), these nations are poised to transition from the CFA franc, which they view as a relic of colonialism, to a new shared currency with Niger. However, the full impact on their GDP remains uncertain, pending further details. Primarily reliant on mining resources, both Mali and Burkina Faso are undergoing significant political shifts with potential economic repercussions.

In the CFA franc zone, Côte d’Ivoire maintains its lead among the top economies, fuelled by sustained economic growth and ongoing oil and gas projects. The Ivorian economy is expected to surpass $100 billion for the first time in 2026, reaching $109 billion by 2027.

Ranking of CFA Zone Economies in 2024: IMF Projections:

• Côte d’Ivoire – $86.91 billion
• Cameroon – $53.20 billion
• Senegal – $35.45 billion
• Burkina Faso – $21.90 billion
• Mali – $21.66 billion
• Benin – $21.37 billion
• Gabon – $21.01 billion
• Niger – $18.81 billion
• Chad – $18.69 billion
• Republic of Congo – $15.50 billion
• Equatorial Guinea – $10.70 billion
• Togo – $9.83 billion
• Central African Republic – $2.81 billion
• Guinea-Bissau – $2.15 billion

According to the office of the United States Trade Representative, in 2022, just before the breakaway of the AES, U.S. goods exports to ECOWAS were $6.7 billion, down 3.3 per cent ($226 million) from 2021 and down 20 per cent from 2012. The office also said U.S. goods imports from ECOWAS totalled $9.4 billion in 2022, up 38.8 per cent ($2.6 billion) from 2021, but down 55 per cent from 2012.  The U.S. trade balance with ECOWAS shifted from a goods trade surplus of $153 million in 2021 to a goods trade deficit of $2.7 billion in 2022. Also, U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in ECOWAS (stock) was $6.8 billion in 2022, a 16.5 per cent decrease from 2021. ECOWAS’ FDI in the United States (stock) was $0.8 billion in 2022, unchanged from 2021.

Analysis

Even as a united bloc, ECOWAS’ trade with the US kept fluctuating. It is thus, possible that the situation could worsen now that Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso have severed ties with the economic bloc. With a lot of the intra-regional trade being informal and normally executed through unapproved border entries, the rift between ECOWAS and the AES members, all of whom are landlocked, could deal regional trade a hefty blow, especially as regional integration has been slow despite the efforts of ECOWAS and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) to weave intra-regional trade among the member states.

The consequences could be even more devastating for the ordinary citizen in the AES member states, who might no longer have free trading access to their networks in the ECOWAS region, as a result of border closures and restriction on free movement between the landlocked Sahelian and coastal countries. The effect can be devastating and rippling. The ECOWAS-AES rift risks affecting the livelihoods of millions of farmers, herders, artisans, transport operators, exporters, importers, freighters among others. The situation could reverse the hard work and effort put in by ECOWAS these nearly five decades in bridging economic activities between the semi-arid climate-vulnerable terrorism-riddled Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea.

Because they are less industrialised and under-urbanised than their coastal neighbours, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger are heavily reliant on regional trade than their coastal neighbours. They mainly depend on the ports of their coastal neighbours for pretty much almost everything that they do not manufacture or are unable to produce at home. Without access to the ports of Cotonou, Lomé, Abidjan or Tema, the cost of Sahelian imports will skyrocket. Farm produce and livestock, which were major sources of intra-regional trade, could take a heavy blow.

The coastal countries in ECOWAS are large scale importers of onions, tomatoes and other produce from the Sahel region. The situation, however, is likely to stir informal and illegal economic activities at the border towns, especially smuggling, which also comes with its own security concerns. The restrictions on the movement of people could also have a significant impact on migration, a situation that might in turn, open up human smuggling and trafficking routes and worsen the problem of the long and dangerous treks by would-be immigrants from the Sahel to the Gulf of Guinea, who hope to make it to Europe through the Sahara. This means more African migrants are going to die in the desert and the Mediterranean in their quest to make it to Europe for a better life.

ECOWAS at 49 and the Prospects for Progress

The Deputy Secretary-General of ECOWAS Babatunde Paul Ajibade has said that “Over the last 49 years, through collective efforts, ECOWAS has made great strides in regional economic integration, and the promotion of democratic governance and sustainable development, as well as an emphasis on peace and stability in West Africa and the Sahel.”

Ajibade who was speaking at a high-level event on peace and security forum on the theme, “Regionalism, Democracy and Development in West Africa: Building Blocks to Strengthening Multilateralism” said “ECOWAS remains a pioneer for regional integration in Africa. Its progress is a testament to the power of unity and the impact of a shared vision.”

He however noted that the region had seen an exponential rise in terrorism that has reversed its development gains. He said this had been further exacerbated by the resurgence of unconstitutional changes of government posing a significant threat to regional stability.

“The growing threat of terrorism spreading from the central Sahel to coastal countries is creating new dynamics bringing new risks of conflict beyond the region. We are witnessing a rise in humanitarian needs, creating competing demands with the social investments that are required to build resilience and promote equal opportunities for all the people of the region”; he added.

Every election usually comes with all manner of rumours, propaganda, half-truths and sometimes, plain lies. In the past, this happened where such sources of misinformation managed to escape the scrutiny of media gatekeepers. In the past decade, social media and artificial intelligence have made it even easier for such potential sources of falsehood to spread. If there is any consolation, it is that even social media platforms are now seeing the threat of their being used as conveyor belts of misinformation and disinformation.

This year, almost half of the world’s population will be voting, according to the National Democratic Institute, a non-profit American non-governmental organisation whose stated mission is to “support and strengthen democratic institutions worldwide through citizen participation, openness and accountability.” In at least 61 countries, nearly half of the global population will head to the polls. This includes eight of the ten most populous nations: Bangladesh, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, and the United States.

The European Union will also hold elections to the European Parliament in June. All in all, around 2 billion people—about a quarter of everyone on the planet—will have the chance to vote this year. About 15 of those elections will be held in Africa. And as is the case with elections in the United States, Asia and Europe, national elections in African countries are typically fraught with misinformation and disinformation. In the case of Africa, the threats of misinformation are even more likely, as democracy on the continent is still struggling to take a firm foothold. Therefore, misinformation and disinformation are more likely to lead to coups, wars, civil strife, ethnic cleansing and other atrocities.

The Oxford Dictionary defines disinformation as “False information which is intended to mislead, especially propaganda issued by a government organisation to a rival power or the media.” The Wikipedia definition is even more poignant: “Disinformation is false information deliberately spread to deceive people.

Disinformation is an orchestrated, adversarial activity in which actors employ strategic deceptions and media manipulation tactics to advance political, military, or commercial goals”; While the Oxford Dictionary defines misinformation as “False or inaccurate information, especially that which is deliberately intended to deceive.”

According to Wikipedia, “Misinformation is incorrect or misleading information. Misinformation can exist without specific malicious intent; disinformation is distinct in that it is deliberately deceptive and propagated. Misinformation can include inaccurate, incomplete, misleading, or false information as well as selective or half-truths.”

Evidence of both misinformation and disinformation have already been witnessed in some of the elections that have taken place so far in different parts of the world and are also manifesting in those countries  that are yet to hold elections this year. AI and social media are tools that can be used for good or bad in an election. In the run-up to the 9-phase elections from 7 April to 12 May in India, for example, the influence of AI was substantively felt. Prime Minister Narendra Modi used AI to address an audience in Hindi by using the government-created AI tool Bhashini, which was then translated into Tamil in real time. Just over the border in Pakistan, AI allowed jailed politician Imran Khan to address a rally. Politicians and political parties take advantage of social media to disseminate information (press statements, videos and pictures of political activities, achievements etc.) cheaply and widely, since such platforms have a massive, instant following than traditional media.

However, the dark side of both AI and social media is beginning to cause worry. In the Indian elections, for example, two viral videos showed Bollywood stars Ranveer Singh and Aamir Khan campaigning for the opposition Congress party, according to the BBC. Both filed police complaints saying these were deepfakes, made without their consent. On 29 April, Prime Minister Modi also raised concerns about AI being used to distort speeches by senior leaders of the ruling party, including him.

The next day, police arrested two people, one each from the opposition Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) and the Congress party, in connection with a doctored video of Home Minister Amit Shah. Also, deepfakes of popular deceased politicians appealing to voters as if they were still alive have become a popular campaign tactic in India. There was also a video of an opposition lawmaker in Bangladesh — a conservative Muslim majority nation — wearing a bikini.

According to TechTarget, Deepfake AI is “a type of artificial intelligence used to create convincing images, audio and video hoaxes.” It says the term describes both the technology and the resulting bogus content, and is a portmanteau of deep learning and fake. Deepfakes, TechTarget noted, often transform existing source content where one person is swapped for another. They also create entirely original content where someone is represented doing or saying something they didn’t do or say.

TechTarget warns: “The greatest danger posed by deepfakes is their ability to spread false information that appears to come from trusted sources. For example, in 2022 a deepfake video was released of Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy asking his troops to surrender.” It said concerns have also been raised over the potential to meddle in elections and election propaganda, adding that while deepfakes pose serious threats, they also have legitimate uses, such as video game audio and entertainment, and customer support and caller response applications, such as call forwarding and receptionist services.

Deepfakes have become ingrained in US elections. An article by   Emil Sayegh, the President and CEO of Ntirety and published on   14 May, 2024 by Forbes   listed some examples of deepfakes:

1.         A manipulated video on Twitter suggesting President Biden incorrectly stated Russia’s occupation duration of Kyiv.

2.         Manipulated footage claiming Senator Elizabeth Warren advocated barring Republicans from voting in the 2024 presidential election.

3.         Altered audio on TikTok falsely conveying President Biden’s threats to deploy F-15s to Texas.

4.         A video alteration making Vice President Harris appear inebriated and nonsensical.

5.         An online  AI-generated photo falsely showing ex-President Donald Trump with Jeffrey Epstein and an underaged girl.

6.         AI-created images on x (formerly Twitter) falsely depicting President Biden in military attire.

7.         A PAC-supported advertisement misusing AI to replicate Donald Trump’s criticism of Iowa Governor Kim Reynolds.

8.         AI-generated portrayals of Donald Trump and Joe Biden in a fictitious debate on Twitch.

9.         A DeSantis campaign video with AI-fabricated images attacking Donald Trump.

10.       Synthetic speech suggesting President Biden made comments on financial instability, potentially inciting market chaos or misleading corporate leaders.

A June 6, 2024 article by Shanze Hasan published on www.brennancenter.org mentioned that earlier this year, AI-generated robocalls imitated President Biden’s voice, targeting New Hampshire voters and discouraging them from voting in the primary. Additionally, an AI-generated image falsely depicting former president Trump with convicted sex trafficker Jeffrey Epstein and a young girl began circulating on Twitter.

Outside the US, the article listed a few other election-related incidents such as the circulation of deep fakes in the Slovakian election last year, defaming a political party leader and possibly helping swing the election in favour of his pro-Russia opponent.   A 16 March, 2024 VOA report on Slovakia said there was a fake audio of the country’s liberal party leader discussing changing ballots and raising the price of beer. The VOA also lists a video of Moldova’s pro-Western president leader throwing her support behind a political party that is friendly to Russia.

Shanze Hasan’s article, titled, ‘The Effect of AI on Elections Around the World and What to Do About It,’ recalled that in January this year, the Chinese government, apparently, tried to deploy AI deepfakes to meddle in the Taiwanese election. As well, the author observed that a wave of malicious AI-generated content is appearing in Britain ahead of its election, scheduled for July 4. One deepfake depicted a BBC newsreader, Sarah Campbell, falsely claiming that British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak promoted a scam investment platform.

The article mentioned an instance where the leading candidate for president in Indonesia, a former general, deployed an AI-generated cartoon to humanise himself to appeal to younger voters. Also, in Belarus, the country’s embattled opposition ran an AI-generated “candidate” for parliament. The candidate — a chatbot that describes itself as a 35-year-old from Minsk — is part of an advocacy campaign to help the opposition, many of whom have gone into exile, reach Belorussian voters.

Ahead of Singapore’s elections due in 2025, the country has already started experiencing the threat of AI deepfakes. Channelnewsasia.com reported on 1 June 2024 that a widely circulated WhatsApp message is making the rounds claiming that new Prime Minister Lawrence Wong has called for polls to be held on September 6, 2024. According to Channel News Asia, however, no such election can be called without the Electoral Boundaries Review Committee, which, it noted, “has not even been convened – at least as of April 18, 2024 – and this is a necessary step before an election can be called.”

South Africa’s recent election brought the influence of social media and AI in African politics to the fore when Tech giants Meta (owners of Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram and Threads), as well as TikTok, X (formerly Twitter) and Google refused to share detailed election plans and engage with civil society on their plans to douse social media-enabled fake news and intemperate language, such as happened in 2021 which sparked off violence that resulted in the killing of 300 people following a contempt case against former President Jacob Zuma, who is now the leader of splinter party uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK). Ahead of this year’s election, Mr Zuma was disqualified from running in the upcoming elections due to a prior prison sentence for contempt of court. His supporters rejected the decision.

“If these courts, which are sometimes captured, if they stop MK, there will be anarchy in this country. There will be riots like you’ve never seen in this country. There will be no elections,” Theeastafrican.co.ke, quoted MK’s leader, Mr Visvin Reddy, as threatening in a widely circulated video on social media in March 2024. Mr Reddy is facing charges of inciting public violence, along with other MK party members over the incendiary comment. Also, social media posts, including a TikTok video, showed individuals wearing MK shirts and brandishing firearms. In January 2024, over 60 people linked to MK were charged with instigating deadly riots in 2021, the report said.

Threats of AI-generated misinformation and disinformation in Africa

Africa is a potentially volatile continent when it comes to electoral politics and democracy. Several countries on the continent are now getting used to the idea of democracy, which is slowly taking root. Even without the threat of misinformation and disinformation, elections are often a very tense and fragile exercise on the continent. Adding AI misinformation and disinformation to the mix makes it even dicier. This development is a serious threat to the continent’s democracy, especially when some regions, such as the Sahel, are opting for military coups and demonstrating undemocratic tendencies by annulling all the democratic progress made in the past few decades through national elections.

It is worth noting too, that Africa is a highly religious, conservative and multi-ethnic continent with a potpourri of cultures. Without AI-generated deepfakes, one man sat on radio in Rwanda and used hate speech to spark a genocide that resulted in the massacring of almost one million people. Without AI-assisted misinformation and disinformation, wars have been sparked among different ethnic groups – some, over livestock, and others, over ethnic and religious rumours and divisions. AI-generated deepfakes could worsen the situation since mobile phones and social media have become commonplace on the continent. In this digital age, any misinformation or disinformation will spread like wildfire and the devastating consequences would be unparalleled by any pre-AI historical events.

Big Tech tackling deepfakes

Tech companies are, however, racing to rein in the dark side of AI-generated content to forestall misinformation and disinformation. TikTok, for instance, announced in May this year that it will begin labelling A.I.-generated content, according to CNN. The international news network also reported that Meta said last month that it will begin labelling AI content. YouTube, CNN added, has also introduced rules mandating creators to disclose when videos are A.I.-created so that a label can be applied. Elon Musk’s X has, however, not announced any plans to label A.I.-generated content. OpenAI, the ChatGPT-creator that allows users to in turn create  A.I.-generated imagery through its DALL-E model, said last month that it would soon launch a tool that allows users to detect when an image is built by a bot. The company confirmed that it would launch an election-related $2 million fund with Microsoft to combat deepfakes that can “deceive the voters and undermine democracy.”

In Africa, Dubawa, a project of the Centre for Journalism Innovation and Development (CJID), has developed a chatbot, an AI tool to fact-check content and bust deepfakes. Premiumtimesng.com quoted Monsur Hussain, the head of Innovation at the CJID, as saying the Dubawa Chatbot is developed to give accurate and timely responses to claims or questions. He said the tool has access to real-time internet data, unlike other AI tools like the ChatGPT and MetaAI, both of which “do not have access to real-time internet data.

“The Dubawa Chatbot is an AI tool built to provide answers to everyday questions regarding viral misinformation and disinformation in the information ecosystem,” the chatbot answered when asked about its function. “It aims to reduce the spread of harmful and misleading content online by offering results and references from credible sources”, he added.

In Ghana, which goes to the polls on 7 December 2024, the country’s Cyber Security Authority, according to ClassFMonline.com, has pledged to collaborate with the tech giants to combat the spread of misinformation and disinformation online, particularly on social media platforms. The Authority explained that with the elections approaching, the nation is likely to encounter AI-driven misinformation campaigns due to the swift pace of digitalisation.

Describing deepfakes as a “malicious” activity when he spoke at the West African Regional CSIRTS Symposium in Accra, Dr Albert Antwi Boasiako, Director-General of the Cyber Security Authority, warned that “there will be a pattern of cyber-attacks” as the election approaches.

Dr Albert Antwi Boasiako said, “Criminals are innovating their process, and we’re likely to see AI-powered disinformation and misinformation campaigns. That makes it a little bit difficult for us, but we’re working with the technical service providers – those who own the platform.

“They also have mechanisms to attack us. So, Facebook, Twitter, which is now X and others; we’re engaging with them to ensure that as we get close to the elections, we will be able to detect and prevent some of those issues”; Dr Boasiako said.

Introduction

One of the biggest problems facing the globe today is the spread of false information. Misinformation and disinformation are not recent phenomena. They are as old as communication itself and predate the internet, social media and other sources of information available today.

The urge people feel to distort information in furtherance of their own agendas or interests is the source of this threat. The emergence of the internet and social networking technology and their use to spread misinformation is of great concern the world. The internet’s ability to manipulate and spread false information has had an unforeseen consequence, despite its value in enabling information to reach a larger audience more quickly. Social networking platforms are another popular medium for spreading and amplifying misinformation.

An analysis by the international media and information advocacy group, the Integrity Institute, showed different misinformation and disinformation amplification factors for the various social media platforms-Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and TikTok.

Jeff Allen, a former integrity officer at Facebook and a founder and the chief research officer at the Integrity Institute, has explained that various social media platforms have different factors for the amplification and spread of misinformation because “the more mechanisms there are for virality on a social media platform, the more we see misinformation getting additional distribution.”

The analysis by the Integrity Institute revealed how some social media sites have algorithms that contribute to the spread of misinformation and disinformation. Many sites also have features for the instant sharing of information which aids the amplification and spread of misinformation and disinformation at a click.

Misinformation and disinformation affect practically every facet of life. From information relating to public health, to false reports of the deaths of well-known political figures, misinformation has become a dangerous tool wielded by individuals and groups in their pursuit of goals and objectives. Research has revealed that misinformation and disinformation are more common during national elections. For a country with high levels of illiteracy, It is impossible to overstate the effect that misinformation and deception have on African countries during elections. Although the aim of spreading false information may not always be to influence the outcome of an election, its main objective may be to obscure the truth, raise doubts among voters and alter longstanding voting habits.

These phenomena have had a significant impact on elections throughout Africa. While a politician losing an election may only suffer minor consequences, the repercussions of a lost election can be disastrous and could include the start of civil unrest, the destruction of public and private property and the need to redo entire election cycles.

Election monitoring and surveillance have become increasingly necessary because national elections are delicate and sensitive democratic exercises in most African countries with the ever present threat of insecurity, violence and instability. Misinformation is growing in prominence as a potential elections hazard, endangering the integrity of the voting processes, compromising democratic procedures and weakening electoral integrity.

Case Studies of Disinformation in Some African Elections

Nigeria

Nigeria served as an excellent illustration of how the disarray of information exacerbated the anxiety surrounding the 2023 presidential election. Before and during the national election, over 83 accusations about the election were verified. Some of these allegations not only sparked problems in neighbourhoods where violence is a problem, but they also discouraged some voters from casting ballots at all. Every facet of the Nigerian election in the reviewed year was tinged with disinformation, ambitious reforms, and security concerns. The All-Progressive Congress’s (APC) Bola Tinubu won the presidential contest at the end of the voting. As seen by the animated discussions and divergent predictions for the country’s future after the eight-year administration led by Muhammadu Buhari, it was an intense race. Nothing, perhaps, better captured the intensity of the battle than the degree of misinformation that dominated the information ecology at the time. Even after Tinubu won the final verdict in his favour from the Supreme Court, the trend persisted despite his victory against opposition from several political parties, including Rabiu Kwankwaso of the New Nigeria Peoples Party (NNPP), Peter Obi of the Labour Party, and Atiku Abubakar of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). There were also signs that the information disorder around the election worsened the nation’s security and economic challenges.

Côte d’Ivoire

At the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic, Côte d’Ivoire held national elections on October 31, 2020. Before the day of the election, social media was flooded with false information about the epidemic, with viral posts suggesting that the virus and its spread were orchestrated by the government. These posts further suggested that the masks being sold were contaminated with the coronavirus by the Chinese, causing distrust in the protective gear. There were also rumours that Africans were being used as “guinea pigs” in the testing of the COVID-19 vaccines.  Misinformation of this kind has the power to strike panic and terror in citizens and cause mistrust of governments. This was the case in Côte d’Ivoire when Ivorians blamed the authorities for mishandling the health crisis. Due to perceived difficulties with the voting process, this led to a low voter turnout on Election Day.

South Africa

Despite concerns of Russian interference during South Africa’s 2019 general election, the Institute of Development Studies said analysis found that it was a prolific, home-grown disinformation campaigns on social media that played a significant role. Between 2017 and 2019, the wealthy Gupta family – with close ties to Jacob Zuma – hired UK PR firm Bell Pottinger to create over 100 fake accounts on Twitter, pushing out at least 185,000 posts – with a notable element of disinformation. One example was the hashtag campaign #Jonasisaliar fabricated by the fake accounts to spread false information to discredit then Deputy Finance Minister Mcebisi Jonas. Concerning South Africa’s most recent general election held 0N 29 May 2024, Wired.com reports that Duduzile Zuma-Sambudla, daughter of former South African president Jacob Zuma, on March 9, 2024, tweeted a video that purported to show former US president Donald Trump encouraging “all South Africans to vote for uMkhonto WeSizwe,” her father’s party, in the country’s May 29 elections. In another post, just days before the elections, Zuma-Sambudla, who has more than 300,000 followers, shared videos and photos of what appeared to be paper ballots. The accompanying text accused the African National Congress (ANC), the party currently leading the government, of stealing votes.

Sierra Leone

During Sierra Leone’s 2018 elections, there was a rise in tribal rhetoric. The presidential spokesperson, Abdulai Baratay, accused opposition supporters of voting along tribal lines. He later refuted his own accusation, claiming instead that voters were choosing their candidates based on “regionalism,” a term sometimes used as a euphemism for tribalism. As a result of people taking to the streets in protest, there have been more violent occurrences. There was a pervasive sense of fear and tension throughout the entire area due to the growing likelihood tribal conflicts and violence.

Implications of Misinformation  for Elections

False information is spreading rapidly as a result of the fast-paced nature of social media and the anonymity offered by the internet and social media, which is contributing to the global adaptation of new information and communications technology (ICT). These digital tools have been weaponised by governments and individuals, who use them to promote political candidates, discredit civil society organisations and democratic institutions with statements of defamation, incite public unrest and violence through the posting of offensive election-related content, and more.

All of the previously listed methods used by information manipulators to disseminate false information have obstructed electoral procedures and put electoral integrity, credibility and the standard of democratic discourse at risk. Misinformation can impact citizens’ ability to hold elected officials accountable, distort election results, undermine the legitimacy of the democratic process, taint legal proceedings, and compromise citizen data.

The Implications for Ghana

The experiences of neighbouring nations in the region serve as a clear reminder of the difficult task Ghana faces as it prepares for the country’s presidential and parliamentary elections in December.

Navigating the Perils Posed by Information Disorder: A free, fair, and credible electoral process can be ensured by comprehending the ramifications of information disorder and taking note of the lessons these countries have learned. Statistics have demonstrated that one of the main risks associated with election disinformation is the deterioration of public confidence in the electoral process and the work being done by the Electoral Commission of Ghana (EC). Voters may become sceptical of the validity of the election results as misinformation and disinformation spread doubt and confusion. This was seen in Nigeria where the propagation of false narratives on social media-fuelled mistrust in the political process and endangered the election’s legitimacy. After receiving a disproportionate amount of false information prior to the announcement of the election results, even Liberia met the same fate.

Information overload can also amplify already-existing social tensions and differences, which may spark instability and social upheaval. For instance, false information spread during the elections in Nigeria and Sierra Leone sparked off political unrest and tensions, illustrating the divisive power of disinformation on society as a whole. Information overload can also make it more difficult for citizens to participate actively in democracy and make informed judgments. Misleading stories and material have the power to skew public debate and deter voters from making wise decisions. One such example is Nigeria, where voters’ capacity to evaluate the qualifications of rival politicians and parties was impeded by disinformation that distorted the electoral environment.

Recommendations

Instituting a Fact-Checking Coalition in Ghana

Building on the achievements of other nations’ fact-checking campaigns, Ghana ought to consider forming a Fact-Checking Coalition made up of media outlets, educational institutions, and civil society organisations. This group can act as a centralised point for communicating accurate and trustworthy information, dispelling myths, and confirming election results. The Fact-Checking Coalition can strengthen the efficacy of fact-checking initiatives, boost public confidence in the electoral process and function as a barrier against the dissemination of false information throughout the election season by combining resources and knowledge.

The Nigeria Fact-checkers Coalition (NFC) and the Liberia Fact-checking Network (LFN) worked together to counter false information and advance media literacy in their respective nations. For example, the NFC team painstakingly examined over 127 allegations that surfaced during the election season. These included deceptive political remarks and viral social media posts that were re-disseminated for exposure by over 12 media outlets.

Collaboration Between Government, Media, and Civil Society

To effectively address electoral misinformation, Ghana should encourage increased cooperation between government agencies, media outlets, and civil society organisations. This cooperative strategy may entail the development of multi-stakeholder task forces or working groups tasked with keeping an eye out for and responding to incidents of disinformation. In order to enable coordinated responses to new risks and ensure accountability and transparency in the management of electoral information, regular communication and information-sharing channels should also be established.

Amplifying Media Literacy Programmes

Ghana must prioritise media literacy programs to equip its citizens with the skills and knowledge needed to critically assess media in the run-up to elections. This can be achieved by creating comprehensive educational courses that emphasise critical thinking, digital literacy and methods for verifying information. While South Africa is a leading nation in sub-Saharan Africa in promoting media literacy instruction at various educational levels, countries like France and Britain are also leaders in this regard. Public awareness campaigns can further support media literacy programmes and encourage individuals to actively engage with diverse information sources while remaining vigilant against the spread of false material. For example, the Nigeria Fact-Checkers Coalition (NFC) made significant investments in media appearances and campaigns to promote media literacy throughout the nation.

Tools, Resources, and Skills for Fighting Misinformation and Disinformation During Elections

Election observer groups should invest in learning the skills necessary to combat misinformation and disinformation, as well as stay updated on digital tools that can aid this effort. Regardless of the type of incorrect information, fundamental abilities are required to effectively combat misinformation and disinformation. Using fact-checking as a weapon against misinformation during elections requires analytical prowess and acute observation. It is critical to set aside all biases during the process in order to ensure the production and dissemination of accurately verified, impartial information to audiences. Verification requires a variety of instruments and expertise depending on the different forms of fraudulent information.

Conclusion

Misinformation and disinformation destabilise societal cohesion. People create deepfakes and spread fake information on social media, often discrediting others in the pursuit of their own selfish goals and ambitions. Social media handlers sometimes use disinformation to gain more followers, leading to fights and disagreements. To resolve the menace of misinformation and disinformation, the government can use advanced technology to detect, block, and counter disinformation.

The state must also understand how disinformation can impact international trust and security. Misinformation and disinformation seriously jeopardise the credibility of elections and must be fought. Elections everywhere in the world are supposed to be free, fair, transparent and peaceful by international democratic standards.